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Introduction
The following article deals with some common misconceptions about
deminers, demining, and demining equipment. It is not an academic
paper, but it is rather a discussion prompt. Some of the points are old
enough to appear bearded to the field mensorry about thatbut
newcomers still need to hear them. A few are contentious. To some
extent, I am playing devil's advocate although all of the points raised in
this article have arisen during my field work. I believe that they deserve
an airing, and I would be interested to hear any wellreasoned, contrary
opinions, or any words of support. Please send such comments to me at
avs@landmines.demon.co.uk.
Throughout this article, I quote common misconceptions and important
factors in bold italics. In some cases, I might not have used quite the
right wording, but I think I have caught the intent. Those who know me
might recognize some arguments, but their presence here does not have
validity, but I would be the first to admit that no single correct answer
exists.

Least Helpful Misconceptions
Several myths about demining exist, and these myths tend to irritate me much more
than they should. My least favorite is the line favored by politicians:
"If we can send men to the moon, we must be able to do better than a man with
a prod!"

Of course, it looks as though it would be easy to improve on the prod,
but how do you improve on the person? Anyone who has been engaged
in manual demining knows that the deminer gathers data constantly from
eyes, hands, and even through the soles of his boots. That information is
processed almost instantly, and balanced judgments result. The human
eye is actually the most effective detector. It recognizes subtle clues
faster than any machine, and the eye is responsible for locating more

devices than any other tool.
Critics often present the "man with a prod" as an unsophisticated cave
man technology. In fact, it is more sophisticated than any artificial device
yet available. No matter how many millions of dollars are thrown at
robotics, it will be a very long time before machines equal the
sophisticated array of data gathering and processing equipment that is a
human beingnever mind transforming technology into a small,
intelligent, and autonomous robot. And as far as prods are concerned, I
discuss "improvements" later in this article.
"More mines are being laid than cleared today."

Most of the mines currently in the ground were moreorless "donated" to
support surrogates in Cold War conflicts that were played out on foreign
soil. Millions of mines were effectively dumped in ideological conflict
regions. Their local use was often profligate and their utility assumed to
be proven (partly because of the examples of indiscriminate use set by
the US and the Soviets in South East Asia and Afghanistan).
The truth is that since the end of the Cold War, the extensive use of anti
personnel mines appears to have declined rapidly. Meanwhile, the
International Committee for the Red Cross, the ICRC, (who propagated
the "more mines" myth) has failed to answer the thousands who have
asked the crucial question, "Where are the two million new mines being
laid each year?"
"Mines have no place in modern warfare."

This statement is true to a pointfrom a western point of view. If you
fight your wars on foreign soil and have every kind of expensive
technology at your disposal so that you can anticipate a rapid victory, the
prospect of having to clean up your mines later can make them more
trouble than they are worth. If, however, you are fighting a protracted
civil war, mines are usefulas any foot soldier knows. This utility in
drawnout conflicts is why the Vietcong made mines out of wood and
bamboo in their underground workshops and why Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) are common in Bosnia and Afghanistan. You cannot ban
IEDs, which are usually simple mines. The International Campaign to
Ban Landmines (ICBL) has shown that you can make commercially
produced mines more difficult to come by, which I think is good, but
they do not have to pretend that this effort will solve the landmine
problem. As a military friend recently pointed out, any country with the
capacity to put beans in a can or make plastic toys can produce
landmines in quantity when it wants to do so.
The truth is that as long as conflicts continue, victiminitiated devices

(mines) of one kind or another will be used.
"Mines are the greatest killers in postconflict regions."

This statement is a gross oversimplification. In some areas, it is true. In
many areas, it is the other detritus of war that claims the most lives. And
these incidents are not always "accidents." In countries with a ruined
economy and huge number of displaced people trying to grub some kind
of a living, a few pennies for scrap metal can seem very attractive. The
greatest risk depends upon where you happen to be. For example, some
people say that booby traps are the greatest killers in Bosnia, and while
the distinction is pretty academic to the victim, it is critical to the men
cleaning the ground.
The truth is that, while it lacks the soundbite ring, the armaments left
over after a conflict has ended are the greatest killers in postconflict
regions.

Know Your Deminer
"You can meet deminers and find out about demining at conferences."

Briefly, a deminer is not someone you will meet at a conference or
someone who is paid a UN salary. Those people might be Demining
Supervisors, but they do not actually clear mines themselves. I can think
of only three expats who regularly demine among the many hundreds I
have met in my travels, and these expats do so out of an obsessive
personal commitment, not because they are paid to do so. The expat is
far more economically occupied in training and management tasks
(often, 20 local deminers can be employed for the same daily salary of
one expat, not to mention other costs).
This fact is not to say that expats do not take risksthey often do when
unusual circumstances occur, and they occasionally do just by being in
the unstable countries where they are working. These experts frequently
have to put up with a level of management frustration that would drive
lesser men to murder, while they must also juggle more balls than any
circus act and do so while in conditions of considerable physical
hardship. But, on the whole, these individuals do not demine.
The truth is that, in most cases, expats are contractually prohibited from
actual demining, and some of these individuals have never looked for
and found a mine in a real situation. Also, many of the speakers at

conferences are selfprofessed "experts." With notable exceptions, very
few of these persons have much experience at demining on the ground
with a prod.
Expat Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) men usually do get their
handson experience, but they are specialist EOD people rather than
deminers, and when EOD is taken seriously its equipment needs can be
much more sophisticated. Of course (apologies to Andy MacAndrew),
there is a sense in which all demining is EOD, but for the time being it is
simplest to continue to recognize a difference between the two.
I define a "humanitarian deminer" as someone whose principal dayto
day activity involves using their eyes, dogs, detectors, prodders, or other
means to physically clear areas believed to be mined. The man who
makes sure that person is trained, equipped, and works according to the
rules is not a "deminer." By my definition, he is a "demining supervisor."

Deminers
"Demining is a specialist activity that takes a long time to learn."

In many developing countries, most field deminers are local men. They
might have a military background, but this background is rarely one that
involved much indepth training in mine detection and removal. Some
organizations have new deminers working in a live area within ten days
of starting their training. These deminers will then work alongside a
more experience person for up to six months of further "onthejob"
training (often done at reduced pay).
Around the world, most demining organizations give no more than six
weeks of training before putting local deminers in a live situation. These
organizations argue that it is not economical to spend large sums of
money on training when deminers might leave to work with another
organization at any time (the "poaching" of experienced people is a
problem wherever commercial demining is established). The fact that a
trained deminer is usually only paid around US$5 a day is also relevant.
At first glance, this level of training seems inadequate: certainly, it is
very different from what would be considered essential in Europe and in
the USA. But in this case, the training is not for a career in sophisticated
EOD work. It is for a deminer to be able to reliably (and safely) find
devices (not just mines).. Often, these deminers do not even have to set
an explosive chargethe team leader will perform that activity. How long
does it take to learn how to use a particular detector, carefully clear
undergrowth, and prod the ground at the correct angle? Five days? Ten
days? Even then, most of the time is spent on repetition so that what is
deemed "good practice" becomes a habita habit that is then reinforced

by supervision in a live area.
This system works, and from the incomplete information I have gathered
about accidents, it looks as if the highest risk time among deminers is not
their first weeks or even their first year of work. While many details in
accident reports are "suspect," I cannot think of any reason why "length
of service" should be one of them.
Before criticizing the length and the scope of training, remember to place
it in the context where it is applied. In some countries, there are more
deminers injured in road accidents than while working; in many cases,
the risk of an early death from violence and sickness is very high. There
is often no realistic health care, no effective police force, and an openly
corrupt administration (no water supply, no telephone system, and a
currency so worthless that Mercedesowning government ministers keep
their savings in $US while rural children die of common intestinal
parasites). Is it then appropriate to apply western standards to deminer
training when these standards are absent from any other aspect of local
life?
The truth is that while demining is a specialist activity, it does not take
long to learn.
(That said, I still want to see standards rise, and I have been involved in
the local production of protective gear and hand tools for that purpose.
After all, the situation in the postconflict country is supposed to be
improving, and standards across the board should be rising.)

West is Best
"The rules of humanitarian demining must be set by western specialists."

The observant witness in the field will find that published rules are
widely ignored, and the command structure is often evaded. The working
position, use of tools, and even the thoroughness of searching the ground
will vary from site to site. Very little of it will map directly onto the
published operating procedures and the glossy brochures that are
available at home. In the field, the rules are seen as guidelines, and
pragmatism takes over. No one should be surprised by this situation; it
happens in many professions  including the serving military.
In many places around the world, expat staff have told me that the
organizations they have established will collapse as soon as foreign
expertise is withdrawn. I believe they are often right. Some of them think
this collapse is because of a local lack of sophistication or endemic
corruption. Both problems are common, but the reason for
unsustainability might well be that the Western command structure is

simply inappropriate for the local culture. Do not assume that a
command structure suited to local circumstances will be less strict or
efficient. Some locallymanaged commercial companies involved in
demining in Africa are very strict and very cost effective. MineTech and
Mechem are obvious examples. And while commercial companies might
need to be watched closely to ensure that corners are not cut, we might
still be able to learn something about appropriate command structures
from them. I do not mean to suggest the widespread adoption of their
methodswhere discipline and punishment regimes might be brutal
merely their study to see what parts can be usefully adopted.
The truth is that western specialists can usefully provide a starting point,
but the actual rules applied will always vary.
Soldiers might argue about which country's training is the best, but they
tend to accept the above statement as a fact. Many accept that what they
see in the field is not ideal, but it tends to be assumed that a westernstyle
military regime will be the safest and the most efficient way of
organizing humanitarian demining in the field, and it is often seen as the
only option available anyway.
Humanitarian demining is not just about clearing areas of ground. The
management and maintenance of a large groundclearance program
requires very different skills from those of the deminer, and the skills of
the expat staff involved reflect these needs.
At this point, it can be useful to separate demining supervisors from
demining managers. In general, the supervisor regularly spends time in
the field. While the manager might visit the field, he spends the majority
of his working life in an office. In general, the higher the military rank,
the more likely the exsoldier is to be a manager, and the more
experience he will have in the management role.
Demining supervisors usually have a lower military rank and more
handson experience. Most of those supervisors that I have met have a
maximum of eight weeks of military mineclearance training somewhere
in their past, and many of these individuals recognize that this training is
no preparation for the needs of humanitarian demining. To their credit,
most of these persons learn as they go, and some individuals have
become very good at recognizing the needs of their men and at making
incremental improvements to working practice and equipment.
In very few cases does the demining supervisor's background include
training in how to train, never mind how to train an unsophisticated
technician in a developing country. Yet that factor is usually the most
important part of their job. In no case that I know of has the supervisor's
background included an indepth analysis of development issues in the
country and the culture in which they are operating (although a few have
acquired it).
Given the lack of preparation, it is quite astounding how much Demining

Supervisors often achieve, and that is the main argument I can find in
favor of using people with a military background: they might not have
the appropriate skills when they arrive, but they tend not to accept failure
as an option. Whether they are working against or with the management
system, when they achieve things is a moot point in some areas.
One of the most efficient demining NonGovernment Organizations
(NGOs) I have met is not run by people with military training at all, and
it is one of the few run by people who also work as deminers as well as
supervisors. As their profile has grown, they have been obliged to get
some formal explosives training, and they have taken on expats with
military training to meet funder requirements. But their training and staff
extension was after the event rather than in preparation for it.
While using exsoldiers makes sense when emergency rapid action is
required, it is not so obviously desirable when the problem is not one that
can be solved with a single concerted intervention. To devise and
implement a sustainable solution that will continue without foreign
intervention requires skills that are not necessarily part of military
training. In Cambodia and Afghanistan, the UN has recognized this
factor and has appointed people who can see the broader picture to head
the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) and the Mine Action
Center Afghanistan (MACA). These individuals are men with a military
background, and they are men who have put aside the blinders of their
training and accepted the necessary learning curve in the job. More
power to them. Give them the power to appoint a support staff with a
development background (rather than a fancy degree), and their jobs
might become much easier.
The truth is that it is by no means obvious that western military training
is an adequate, appropriate, or sufficient preparation for organizing
humanitarian demining. Neither is it obvious that an MBA \ or a
Doctorate (increasingly UN requirements) from a western university
would help in any way at all.

Demining Equipment
"The equipment issued to our military guys is the best in the world."

From this statement it is sometimes argued that the same equipment
should be used in demining. It rarely is. There are three main reasons
why it is not:

high cost of military equipment,
it is not designed for use in humanitarian demining, and

western world's fascination with technology for its own sake.
Equipment designed for a military purpose is made by an industry that
often thinks cost is not a major issue, and the final value of a piece of
equipment always includes the cost of aggressive marketing. The end
product can include features designed for covert combat situations, such
as camouflage, infrared invisibility, ultralight and ultrasmall
components, multifunction compatibility with other combat equipment,
etc. Often designed for occasional use, it frequently cannot withstand the
"normal" treatment sustained during humanitarian demining in the field.
The Schiebel AN19/2 mine detector is a fine example of this situation,
for defunct units of this model, which is uneconomic to repair, litter the
African countryside.
An ideal design specification for humanitarian demining would not
include the above features and would stress features that do not rank
highly among military needs. The most important are:

low cost,
robust in extended use,
simple operation, and
easy service or repair in the field.
As far as metal detectors are concerned, the Ebinger 420 series comes
closest to these requirements (without meeting them), and so is popular
with "deminers" despite lacking the sensitivity of some competitors.
Detectors are an example of the hightech end of demining equipment.
Probes (prodders) are probably the lowesttech item. The simplest probes
I have seen in use have been lengths of reinforcing bar that cost a dollar.
The most expensive military probe I have encountered is offered at
CAN$700, but the average probe seems to cost around US$100. To
justify the cost, most of these detectors have added value designed in to
their cost. The producers of the fanciest probe claim that their product
can identify the material obstructing their progress through the ground
while other fancy probes contract into short handles or extend into two
meterlong sticks. In some cases, these probes are designed with
humanitarian demining in mind, but they are not designed with low cost,
robustness in extended use, simplicity of operation, and easy service or
repair in the field in mind.
Frequently, the designers have also forgotten to carry out an analysis of
what is wanted. They appear to move directly from a new hightech idea
to a marketing strategy and rely on modern man's fascination with
technology to supply the "need."
The DEW Smartprobe is an example (cost of this fascination with
technology: roughly CAN$700). According to the salesman I spoke with,
this batterypowered probe can discriminate between stone, wood, and

plasticso you probe the ground until you hit something, then read off
what you have hit. Assuming that the probe can cope with paint, bakelite,
or sticky soils, it sounds neat until you think about why anyone would
want a smart probe. The only economical or sensible reasons seem to be
either to accelerate the minedetection process or to make the process
safer.
In most cases, the Smartprobe would be used to investigate a detector
signal. Imagine this scenario: The detector signals, and the deminer
narrows the signal down as best he can; then, he lays aside the detector
and picks up his DEW Smartprobe. On the first insertion, the probe hits
something and the reading says "stone." There could be a pebble in front
of the mine, so the user must again insert the probe into the ground.
Again, the reading is "stone," but that does not prove that there is not a
mine just behind a second stone, so the deminer again inserts the probe
into the ground, and again, and again, and again. To be sure that he is not
dealing with a mine, the user would still have to probe all around the
signal and break up the ground as he went. To meet most clearance
requirements in humanitarian demining, the user would then have to
remove the soil and find the metal that made the detector signal. I cannot
see how it would make that investigation safer, either, but I can see how
it might give false confidence if it was misused. (Thanks to Bob Keeley.)
Quite apart from its initial high cost, the DEW Smartprobe's reliance on
batteries (expensive and hard to get in remote areas), and its apparently
short design life (How many insertions do they think it will make in a
year?), the people behind the DEW Smartprobe do not appear to have
considered the needs of the market before developing this expensive toy.
The truth is that equipment designed for a military purpose is rarely ideal
for use in humanitarian demining.

Doityourself Equipment
"Locally made demining equipment is always of a low quality."

This opinion is rarely stated as bluntly, but it is often a clear assumption
behind the attitude of equipment purchasers. It is an attitude that is
fostered by suppliers of equipment in the westsuppliers who prefer
everyone to source through them. The demining supply industry is a
sophisticated, hardsell extension of the arms supply business, so no one
should expect it to have honesty as one of its major aims.
The main advantages of demining groups having their equipment
supplied from local sources are

low cost (reflecting local employment rates and no sales hype or
R&D),
continued availability (promoting sustainability in demining),
easy maintenance or repair, and
easy inclusion of areaspecific design features.
The main disadvantages are

belief that the equipment is of low quality,
lack of available designs,
initial hassle in establishing quality manufacture, and
problem of guaranteeing availability of raw materials.
With simple manufacturing regimes that include quality assurance
checks at all levels, all four of these disadvantages can be overcome by
manufacturing in a stable neighboring countryas long as the product is
simple or is an incremental improvement on what is already used. No
design awards here, just common sense. Most field men can readily
suggest improvements to existing tools, and many of them can explain
what they want an new piece of equipment to do even if they do not have
the familiarity with a sketchpad to draw it.
The truth is that perfectly adequate, locallymade simple tools exist
(Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) Mozambique, HALO Cambodia,
CMAC Cambodia, etc.). More sophisticated items such as blast visors
and body armor can also be made regionally, as has been proven in my
own work.

Billiondollar Equipment
"We need to spend millions of dollars and use our best brains and facilities to
develop new equipment for demining."

This assumption seems to rest on the belief that "Incremental changes are
too small to countwe need a paradigm leap forward to solve this
problem now." This assumption also contains the presupposition that the
need could only be met by the "best" brains in western R&D.
Since 1994, I have seen considerable changes to the equipment used on
the ground. The changes are largely in two areas:

deminer tooling and protection, and
mechanical assistance.

These areas serve the two purposes of enhancing safety and enhancing
speed, and the division between purposes maps well onto the division
between equipment areas.
None of the recent changes are the direct result of any new expenditure
on western research and development. Reasons for this failure of R&D
effort range from confused design criteria (mixing military needs with
those of humanitarian demining) to plain ignorance of the problems in
the field. In many cases, the inappropriateness of the design has been
made obvious early in its development, but once the funds have been
granted and the developers appointed it seems that the work must go on
regardless of the situation.
Commercial developers suffer the same confused design aims. To return
to the example of detectors, a Schiebel salesman told me that there are
not enough sales in humanitarian demining to warrant the development
of a detector for that market, so his company's detectors continue to be
designed primarily for the military. These companies, however, know
what is wanted (I, among others, have told them), but profit must come
first.
Leaving aside the incremental improvement of demining tooling and
protection (an area where my interest might make me less than
objective), the development of mechanically assisted demining provides
an object lesson for those who believe that westernbased R&D is
essential. While huge sums are being spent on monstrously heavy and
strong machines that many believe will never work adequately, some
demining groups, such as the NPA in Angola, have taken existing "mine
clearance" vehicles (the Aardvark) and used them in a more realistic role
as an areareduction and vegetationclearance tool, and these applications
have not involved any significant revision of the original machine. While
this process is quick, it is also too expensive for most groups to consider.
The HALO Trust, Mine Tech, and MACA (amongst others) have all
taken existing plant equipment (much cheaper than military equipment)
and adapted it for use in the field. Their converted backhoes, tractors,
and roadgraders dramatically speed up the process of clearance. These
groups have made minimal adjustments (usually armoring) to existing
equipment and got on with the job without applying much thought to
further developments. MgM, who pioneered the use of mulchers and
roadgraders in Angola, have gone one stage further. With a pool of scrap
mineresistant vehicles to draw on (in Namibia) and obsessive personal
commitment, they have made fundamental refinements and developed
dedicated Mechanically Assisted Mine clearance (MAM) systems at a
remarkably low cost (mostly from their own pockets).
The success of all the existing MAM systems relies on them being
developed in the field, where very expensive or impractical ideas are
quickly dropped. Making incremental improvements to what they can get
and with an everyday pressure for speed and effectiveness, these groups
have already made a real difference to demining speed (in most cases,
without compromising safety).

The truth is that MAM systems have been developed in the field at a
fraction of the costs being spent on developing unsuitable equipment in
safe countries overseas. If some of that cost were dedicated to field
refinement, it could be far more effective in terms of speeding up the
ground clearance.
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